A Trial Palestinian State Must Begin in Gaza

In November 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met in Algiers and issued a Declaration of Independence, proclaiming the state of Palestine. The declaration grounded the new state in the 1947 U.N. Partition Resolution, which called for two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The PLO’s goal, as with Hamas today, had previously been the “liberation” of all of Palestine, from the river to the sea. In the 1988 declaration, the PLO reversed that position. Four weeks later, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist.

Immediately following the proclamation, Algeria, the host country, announced its recognition of the state of Palestine. And almost immediately, the United States launched a worldwide effort to persuade other countries to withhold recognition and thwart the Palestinians in their campaign to gain admission into international organizations.

Today, 139 countries recognize the state of Palestine, but this does not include the major Western democracies. The state is a member of many international organizations but not the United Nations, where the United States, through the Security Council, has blocked admission. Yet since 2012, Palestine has been recognized by the United Nations as a non-member observer state.

Now, triggered by the war in Gaza, this may change. British Foreign Secretary David Cameron, has stated that the United Kingdom is considering recognizing Palestine and supporting its membership in the United Nations. More importantly, it has been reported that this is also under consideration by the U.S. State Department.

Prior to Oct. 7, 2023, recognition by the United States and admission of the state of Palestine to the United Nations would have been a major accomplishment for Fatah (the biggest secular Palestinian political party), the PLO, and for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who also holds the title of President of the state of Palestine.

This would not have fundamentally changed the widespread Palestinian judgment that the entire Oslo Accords process was a disaster for the Palestinians, but it would have kindled a small spark of hope and would have counted for something in Fatah’s struggle with Hamas, which replaced the PLO as the home for Palestinians who remained committed to liberating all of Palestine and to the use of armed struggle to do so.

If it happens now, Hamas, whose popularity among Palestinians has grown and will grow further if there is a release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the Israeli hostages, will likely take credit. It will maintain that this recognition, which the PLO was not able to accomplish, demonstrates that only armed struggle produces results.

And within Israel, such moves will likely increase the political fortunes of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. U.S. President Biden’s advocacy of the two-state solution is already being used by Netanyahu as a central theme in his effort to win the next Israeli election, despite his dismal polling numbers. He claims that, were it not for him, Israel would be presently facing a Hamas-controlled state in the West Bank, and that only he can stand up to U.S. pressure.

Key figures in the Israeli center who might challenge Netanyahu in the next election are sufficiently concerned that they have asked Washington to stop talking, at least in public, about the two-state solution. Unilateral recognition of Palestine by the United States would be used by Netanyahu in his efforts to stoke Israeli fears.

That said, U.S. recognition of Palestine and its admission to the United Nations can be hugely important in the effort to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but to do so, such steps must be part of a comprehensive peace plan, one that acknowledges the new reality that Oct. 7 has created for Israelis. That day, Israelis underwent a trauma whose impact will endure. Israelis lost a sense of security that had long become part of their lives. They lost trust in their government and in their military, their intelligence services, and their technology. Hamas’s slaughter awakened the historic memories of the Holocaust and of centuries of pogroms.

Post-Oct. 7, no Israeli government will ever agree to a Palestinian state in the West Bank unless ­there is substantial confidence that it will not be a threat to Israel. No set of written arrangements, including provisions that say the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, will supply Israelis with the degree of confidence that is necessary before they will risk a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank.

If there is an answer, it will require abandoning the defunct Oslo paradigm, which sees Palestinian statehood emerging as a result of successful end-of-conflict negotiations. The alternative is a sovereignty-in-Gaza-first approach: to test Palestinian statehood in Gaza first, and only if it is successful over an agreed period, to then move to negotiations on extending Palestinian sovereignty to the West Bank.

The Gaza-first approach to Palestinian statehood has a long history. Its strongest Israeli proponent was Shimon Peres. Back in 1995, at Peres’s request, I presented to Yasser Arafat a 20-point Gaza-first proposal I had developed. Arafat abruptly rejected it, not unreasonably, fearing that Gaza-first would become Gaza-last. But that was in the heyday of the Oslo Accords, when other paths to statehood seemed possible. Today, for Israelis, actual lived experience with a trial state in Gaza may be the only path to the two-state solution.

Here are the main components of what a “Gaza-first plan” might look like—one that integrates U.S. recognition of the state of Palestine into a path to peace:

1. The United States (or a group of Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar) will put forward a plan for a trial Palestinian state in Gaza, with permanent status negotiations between Israel and the state of Palestine to be held only after a successful, three-year demonstration by the new state that it is stable, committed to peace with Israel, and has been successful in achieving de facto sovereignty over Gaza. The State of Palestine would have to attain respect for its authority from nonstate actors, especially Hamas. Hamas would have to relinquish its ability to initiate hostilities, including the possession of heavy weapons, missile production, and weapons smuggling.
2. If the PLO accepts this Gaza-first test of Palestinian sovereignty, then the United States would stop blocking Palestine’s admission to the U.N. and commit to recognizing the state of Palestine once it establishes de facto sovereignty over Gaza.
3. The PLO or Fatah, under Arab auspices, would then begin negotiations with Hamas over the group’s future. The goal will be agreement that once Israel withdraws from Gaza, Hamas will accept the authority of the Palestinian state. Further, agreement will be sought on conditions that Hamas-affiliated candidates will have to meet in order to participate in Palestinian elections, including acceptance of the Declaration of Independence’s language that Palestine “rejects the threat or use of force, violence and terrorism, against … the territorial integrity of other states.”
4. If the PLO-Hamas negotiations are successful, Israeli forces in Gaza will be rapidly replaced by security forces from the Palestinian Authority. If they are not successful, then Palestine will receive assistance from other Arab states, or an international force, to establish its sovereign control of Gaza, leading to Israel’s exit.
5. Once the state of Palestine establishes control over Gaza, it would be recognized by the United States and Israel—but with its recognized sovereignty, at this point, limited to Gaza. Upon Israeli recognition of the state of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority will cease to exist. All its administrative functions and assets and bureaucracy in the West Bank will be assumed by the state of Palestine.
6. The emerging state will hold its first elections in both the West Bank and Gaza. All candidates for office will be required to meet the conditions discussed above.
7. Upon the election of the first government of Palestine, the two states, Israel and Palestine, will exchange ambassadors and pledge peaceful coexistence. The United States will sponsor negotiations between the two states on lifting the blockade of Gaza and on how to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza.
8. To demonstrate that it is serious about future negotiations over the West Bank, Israel will also agree to a complete halt to the expansion of West Bank settlements, and to control and punish violence and intimidation of Palestinians by Israeli settlers.
9. After the transfer of power to the state of Palestine, the settlement freeze, and the opening of negotiations on lifting the blockade of Gaza, Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel.
10. Upon a declaration by Palestine that it has attained de facto sovereignty over Gaza, the three-year trial period will commence. If it is successful, as judged by an implementation commission composed of the United States and the Arab countries that have recognized Israel, then Washington will convene permanent status talks between the two states. Those negotiations will be based on the final status parameters articulated by then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016. These not only included the demilitarization of the Palestinian state and security provisions for Israel, but also a commitment that the borders of Palestine in the West Bank will be based on the 1967 lines, modified by equal land swaps, and with a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem.

Making Palestinian statehood a reality would allow Palestinian moderates to take over Gaza from the Israelis without appearing to be Israeli subcontractors or a police force furthering the occupation. Without this fundamental change in its role, the notion of a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” taking effective control of Gaza, as Biden has proposed, is delusional.

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Much will depend on the size and capabilities of Palestine’s security forces. But most of all, success or failure will depend on whether the Palestinian people themselves believe that this statehood trial really offers a path to comprehensive independence. If so, succeeding in the trial will have widespread Palestinian support, and this in turn will affect Hamas’s willingness to accept the authority of the state. Essentially, Hamas will be faced with a choice between marginalization or evolution.

Ironically, this approach may also appeal to many Israelis who currently oppose a Palestinian state. This is because, apart from fierce right-wing ideologues, most of the Israeli opposition to a Palestinian state rests on the belief that real peace with such a state is not possible. For those firmly of this view, a Gaza-first test may appeal to them, if only because they believe that Palestine will prove to be a failed state.

For the centrists seeking to lead Israel, a Gaza-first trial is a pragmatic option that serves to neutralize Netanyahu’s claim that only he can prevent the imposition of a Palestinian state with West Bank sovereignty. Further, testing sovereignty does not tie Israel’s hands if a Palestinian state is unable to gain actual sovereign power over Gaza. At the same time, a trial state in Gaza potentially offers Israel a chance that it would not otherwise have: a way to permanently withdraw from Gaza, rather than having to face an interminable insurgency.

Gaining Saudi recognition of Israel by committing only to good-faith testing of Palestinian sovereignty will significantly enhance interest in the plan for all Israelis.

For the moderate Palestinian leadership, this framework provides a major achievement towards a full end to the occupation, with actual sovereignty in some part of Palestine.  And recognition by the United States will mean a Palestinian Embassy in Washington, a U.S. ambassador to Palestine, and worldwide acceptance of symbols of Palestinian sovereignty including passports and a currency.

Palestinians will be wary, as Arafat was in 1995, that Gaza-first will become Gaza-last, but such fears will be alleviated by a permanent halt to Israeli settlement expansion.

For those on both sides who are deeply committed to resolving the conflict, a Gaza-first approach provides an opportunity to demonstrate that lasting peace is possible, as well as an opportunity to develop new approaches to final-status arrangements outside the Oslo paradigm. Most importantly, it offers a credible path to the end of the conflict, without playing into Netanyahu’s hands.